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This paper sets out to assess the information that can be derived from spreads between yields on
government bonds, considered as having a zero default probability, and yields on risky bonds, i.e.
whose default probability is not zero. In the first part, we shall give a reminder of the main theoretical
approaches used for calculating default risk and its term structure, and, in the second part, we shall
examine the difficulties encountered in the empirical analysis of credit spreads. We shall also focus
on the problems involved in measuring spreads and the limitations of their information content,
given that they may reflect, above and beyond the default risk, the existence of a liquidity risk.
C
redit spreads, i.e. the spread between the yield
on a corporate bond and the yield on a
government bond 1, have long been a focus
of attention. In the past few years there has been
renewed interest in studying these spreads due to
the decline in government debt issuance associated
with the reduction in fiscal deficits at the end of the
1990s, and the attendant sharp increase in debt
securities issued by private borrowers, as well as the
recent expansion of the credit derivatives market.
These spreads have been studied in terms of the
issuer’s rating and sector, the bond’s maturity,
duration, etc. Given the increasing influence of the
rating awarded by international credit rating agencies
— in prudential regulation with the Basel II accords,
and in the asset management industry with the
quantitative constraints on lower-rated issuers — it
is important to consider the link between the rating,
which is a qualitative measurement of default risk,
and the yield spread, which is a quantitative
measurement: how reliable are ratings as an
indicator of the level of credit risk? When analysing
credit risk, we are faced with a number of technical
problems associated with the actual measurement
of these spreads, and the fact that they also reflect
premiums, some of which have no direct link with
default risk, such as the liquidity premium. For
example, flights to quality are also flights to liquidity,
and the widening of spreads during financial crises
indicates both an increase in default risk and the
liquidity risk. The fundamental question is therefore
to ascertain whether it is possible to measure, in the
yield spreads observed on the market, the component
actually reflecting default risk, i.e. the probability of
an issuer defaulting and the recovery rate
(percentage of the debt recovered in the event of a
default), which would allow these spreads to be used
more effectively as credit risk indicators.
1 These spreads may also be measured against the swap yield curve, hence the term “swap spreads”.86 FSR • How much credit should be given to credit spreads? • November 2002
1| Credit risk in financial theory
Two main theoretical approaches are used for
measuring credit risk:
– The “structural” approach, which posits that the
asset value of a firm follows a stochastic process,
and that the price of the firm’s debt is equal to
that of a put option on this value;
– and the “reduced-form” approach, in which the
default is given exogenously and the default and
recovery rates are randomly modelled for a
homogenous (in terms of credit risk) sample of
issuers generally grouped by rating.
It is however necessary, in both cases, to have
information on the recovery rate in the event of
default, which is an important factor of credit risk.
In addition to the recovery rate, the maturity of
bonds is another explanatory variable of spreads,
even though the results of studies differ with regard
to the shape of the term structure of yield spreads
for speculative grade issuers (i.e. rated below BBB
by Standard and Poor’s and Baa by Moody’s).
1|1 The “structural” approach:
estimating the asset value of a firm
This approach was first set out in articles by Black
and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). It consists in
modelling variations in the asset value of a firm. A
firm defaults on its debt if the value of its assets
falls below a specific threshold, in other words, the
default is linked to specific characteristics of the
firm.
The logic is the following.
V denotes the value of the firm. Its assets are
financed by issuing equity E and zero-coupon bonds
(so as to avoid having to take into account
intermediary interest rate flows) with maturity T,
face value F and market value D. A credit risk
appears when, at maturity, the asset value of a firm
is likely to fall below the face value of this debt.
At maturity, what is the risk profile of the
bondholder?
If the value of the firm is greater than the face value
of the debt, the investor recovers this face value,
which is the maximum amount that can be obtained.
However, if the value of the firm is lower than the
face value of the debt, despite the fact that
bondholders have priority over shareholders, the
bondholder only recovers the residual value of the
firm, which may even be zero, i.e. a recovery rate of
zero.
By using the analytical framework of options and
their risk profile at expiry, the position of the
bondholder is therefore similar to that of the writer
of a put option on the assets of the firm with a strike
price equal to the face value of the debt.
The market value of the bond at maturity is thus
equal to either the face value of this bond
(if VT > FT ), or the residual value of the firm
(if VT < FT).
For the shareholder, the situation is the opposite: if
the firm defaults, the equity investor recovers
nothing. However, if the value of the firm exceeds
the face value of the debt (VT > FT), the shareholder’s
wealth increases in line with the value of the firm’s
assets. We can therefore say that the shareholder’s
position is equivalent to that of the buyer of a call
option on the value of the firm’s assets with a strike
price equal to the nominal value of the debt.
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Under a number of assumptions regarding the
pattern of the asset value of a firm, an option-pricing
approach can be used to calculate the value of the
debt 2. The price of a risky bond is equal to that of a
risk-free bond (government bond) with an identical
maturity, minus the value of a put option with strike
price F (as the holder of a corporate bond has an
equivalent position to the writer of a put option).
Logically, the price of a risky bond will be lower
than that of a risk-free bond, given that the yield on
the risky bond is higher than that on the risk-free
bond. This difference in yield corresponds to the
credit spread, which can then be computed directly.
The implications of the model: the link between
the stock market and the credit spread
In Merton’s model, the market value of the risky
bond, or the value of the spread, depends on two
fundamental factors:
– Leverage or, more specifically, the ratio between the
present value (the price) of the debt and the firm’s
capital (equity). An increase in the price of the
firm’s equity — except in the case of a speculative
bubble — or a capital increase (issuing shares),
results in, ceteris paribus, a reduction in leverage
and hence a decline in default risk, leading to a
narrowing of the spread. Conversely, a drop in the
share price, or a company share buyback, results
in an increase in leverage and hence an increase
in default risk, leading in turn to a widening of the
spread. The above assumes that changes in the
value of the firm measured by changes in its share
price actually reflect changes in its fundamental
value. If this were not the case, this linkage
between share prices and default risk reflected by
the credit spread would cease to be relevant.
Therefore, in the case of a speculative bubble, for
example, the narrowing of spreads should not be
interpreted as a sign of structural decline in the
companies’ default risk, but rather as a sign of a
lesser perception of risks in the context of collective
euphoria. The chart below shows a continuous rise
in the spreads, while the price of shares initially
rises and then falls. The explanation is
straightforward: over the period, the leverage effect
increases regularly, firstly due to growing corporate
debt (increase in the numerator, i.e. the debt), and
secondly to the fall in stock prices (decrease in the
denominator, i.e. the value of the equity).
Comparison of trends in the CAC 40 index and in credit spreads
In basis points
Sources : Bloomberg, Banque de France
2 These assumptions are those necessary for a Black and Scholes-type model, i.e. the value of the firm is modelled by a geometric Brownian motion (random
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– Volatility of the asset value of a firm. As for any
option valuation, volatility is an essential variable.
Indeed, if we assume that the default occurs at
maturity, the higher the volatility of the asset
value, the greater the likelihood, at this date, that
this value will be lower than that of the firm’s
debt. Logically, the spread, which corresponds to
the additional yield, increases along with the risk,
measured here by the volatility. The problem is
that the value of the firm’s assets, and a fortiori
its volatility, cannot be directly observed. The
solution adopted for testing this type of model
consists in replacing this volatility by that of the
firm’s share price, which is undeniably easier to
measure. The impact of volatility on the level of
spreads should be seen in the light of two
considerations:
– First, the impact of applying the full fair value
accounting principle to balance sheet analysis is
not neutral in terms of the size of spreads. If we
apply, for example, the above rationale to financial
intermediaries, the widespread application
of the full fair value accounting principle,
i.e. marking-to-market an increasing number of
balance sheet items could result in greater
volatility of firms’ assets and liabilities, and thus,
all other things being equal, in an increased
default probability and, ultimately, in a structural
widening of credit spreads. Here, the question is
not to ascertain whether fair value accounting is
the most suitable approach for reflecting the value
of the firm, but rather to stress the possible
consequences arising from the increase in
volatility in terms of the levels and variability of
these spreads, or simply to pinpoint one of the
limitations of the structural approach.
– Second, the impact of share price volatility
varies according to the creditworthiness of the
company, i.e. its rating and type of assets: it
seems that share price volatility has, ceteris
paribus, a larger impact on the market value
of the debt and hence on the spread for
speculative grade companies than for
investment grade companies; this can possibly
be explained by the wider dispersion in spreads
for lower-rated firms.
It is necessary to compare the same type of assets,
and in particular to distinguish between tangible and
intangible assets. Valuing intangible assets such as
brands, consumer networks, etc. is a considerably
more complex exercise than valuing tangible assets.
In general, the valuation of intangible assets is less
reliable, subject to more frequent revision and
therefore more volatile. Yet the weight of intangible
assets significantly increased in the second half of
the 1990s due to the development of new
information and communication technologies,
which partly explains the higher variability of
corporate bond spreads over the past few years.
The Telecom sector illustrates these dynamics
particularly well. The volatility of telecom stocks
remained moderately correlated with trends in the
sector’s spreads between 1994 and 2000. During this
period, operators were very highly valued on the
basis of extremely optimistic future profitability
expectations. The situation changed as new
economy stocks started to correct. The relationship
between spreads and volatility then increased, as
spreads widened following ratings downgrades in
the sector, due to the sharp increase in the leverage
effect.
However, the limitations of this type of model, in
which the option is valued using Black and Scholes’
model, are well-known to market practitioners: on
the basis of a lognormal distribution of asset prices,
it is not possible to take account of the asymmetry
and the thickness of distribution tails (kurtosis).
Furthermore, Merton’s assumption that default can
only occur at maturity is too restrictive; representing
patterns in the value of the firm by a diffusion
process does not allow for the possibility of a sudden
fall in its value, and thus estimated default
probability in the short term becomes negligible.
Consequently, using this modelling technique,
short-term credit spreads for investment-grade
securities are likely to be almost zero, which is the
contrary to the empirical evidence. Using a jump-
diffusion approach yields more realistic results, but
the modelling technique becomes much more
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1|2 “Reduced-form” approach: using
default and recovery rates
In this approach, the credit spread between a risky
bond and a risk-free bond corresponds to the
additional yield required by investors to cover their
risk of loss. The yield differential, which is
contingent on the default and recovery rates
expected by the markets, must theoretically
compensate for the risk so that the expected yield
of a risky bond is equal to that of a risk-free bond,
assuming that investors are indifferent to risk, i.e.
risk-neutral (see Appendix).
Contrary to structural models, reduced-form models
do not explicitly relate the default to the firm’s value,
i.e. do not state the exact cause of default, and hence
it is not necessary to estimate the parameters of the
value of the firm in order to solve these models.
Studies tend to favour this type of model because
company default (bankruptcy) is a complex event
for which the exact causes are often inaccurately
specified, i.e. are either too restrictive or too vague.
Another major difference is the degree of default
predictability: the date of default is a random
variable and is therefore totally unpredictable, which
is not the case in structural models. Lastly, if we
assume that the default probability varies over time
and depends on the level of interest rates 3, these
reduced-form models reflect the two essential
characteristics of defaults, i.e. the probability of a
default occurring and the recovery rate.
In this approach, the level and variation of the credit
spread are contingent on the default and recovery
rates expected by the markets, which are themselves
directly influenced by business cycles. Furthermore,
the level of risk-free interest rates has a significant
impact on this spread. The problem is that, for some
theoreticians, the interest rate effect is positive, in
particular vis-à-vis the financial constraint that it
represents for companies — high interest rates lead
to increased vulnerability for indebted firms — and
negative for others, as it results in, for example, a
supply effect or crowding-out effect — since higher
interest rates curb the supply of corporate bonds.
Assuming demand remains constant, this results in
a rise in prices, i.e. a narrowing of spreads. There is
also a negative interest rate effect in the structural
approach, where higher interest rates result in an
increase in the firm’s forward value (beyond the
strike price), which reduces the default probability
and thus contributes to narrowing the credit spread.
Telecom spread and volatility of the EuroStoxx telecom sub-index
In basis points
Sources : JP Morgan, Bloomberg, Banque de France
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Why the credit spread should reflect the credit risk
By formalising the reduced-form approach, the link between the credit spread and the risk of loss can be
expressed as follows:
For a given bond, p denotes the default probability and µ the recovery rate in the event of default.
As the bond price is equal to the discounted value of expected future cash flows, the price of a zero-coupon
bond with nominal value B, will be equal to the discounted value V of the amount expected at maturity M:
M = p.µ.B + (1 – p).B and thus M = [1 – p (1 – µ)].B
Moreover, the yield r required by a risk-neutral investor must be the same for a risky and a risk-free bond.
Hence, for simplicity’s sake, let us take a single period bond, and where
V = price of a one-year zero-coupon bond and y its spot rate, we obtain:
V = B / (1 + y) = M / (1 + r) =
[1 – p (1 – µ)] B
1 + r
From this, we derive the following spread
y – r =
p (1 – µ) (1 + r)
[1 – p (1 – µ)]
We see that the spread is a function of both the expected loss (default probability and recovery rate in the
event of default) and the level of the risk-free interest rate.
To study a longer bond, pi denotes the marginal default probability of year i (or the marginal default rate)
and µi the marginal recovery rate of year i.
Thus, the average cumulative default rate up to year t is:





As the spread is expressed as a percentage/year, we calculate an average annual probability (rate) p and a
marginal loss li:
p = 1 – [1 – Pt]1/t  and  li = pi (1 – µi)
The expected loss is therefore the cumulative average loss up to year t:




(1 – li) []
and the expected average annual loss:
l = 1– [1 – Lt]1/t
The credit spread is then:
y – r =
p (1 – µ) (1 + r)
[1 – p (1 – µ)]
with µ = 1- l and y and r denoting the spot rates corresponding to the maturity of the zero-coupon bonds used.FSR • How much credit should be given to credit spreads? • November 2002 91
The advantage of this type of approach is that it
provides an a priori fairly simple valuation model
for a risky bond and hence for the yield spread,
derived from the following data: the price of a
risk-free bond of the same maturity, the default
probability and the recovery rate. The price of the
risk-free bond is observed on the market, or
interpolated from the term structure of the price of
zero-coupon bonds, and the recovery rate can be
estimated using historical data for similar bonds,
such as those provided by international credit rating
agencies (see table below), and for different ratings.
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The difficulty resides in estimating the default
probability, which is not the historical default
probability but the risk-neutral default probability 4,
i.e. the default probability adjusted so that that the
expected yields on all bonds, risky and risk-free alike,
are the same and equal to the risk-free interest rate.
This probability may be interpreted as a probability
adjusted for the default risk premium paid to the
investor. This premium corresponds to the price
differential between a risk-free bond and a risky
bond divided by the expected loss, i.e.
Premium = [VG - VCi] / [Vi(1-µi)pi]
where VG is the price of the risk-free bond
VCi is the price of the risky bond with rating i
µi is the recovery rate for rating i
and pi is the historical default probability
Interest rates and AAA spreads in the euro area
In basis points In %
Source : Banque de France
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The adjusted probability can then be estimated by
multiplying the historical probability by this risk
premium (see Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull 1997).
Reduced-form models nevertheless have two main
limitations:
– for bonds with specific clauses relating to the
rating, such as bonds with embedded triggers,
changes in the rating become fundamental in
valuing their prices as these clauses result in
changes in the cash flows from these bonds. A
more complex modelling technique is then
required (see article on contingency clauses);
– these models do not take into account the
systematic risk of bond portfolios, i.e. that the
defaults of different firms are correlated and
coincide with fluctuations in the business cycle.
1|3 Term structure of spreads
and ratings
Another important theoretical aspect, analysed by
two modelling approaches, is the shape of the term
structure of yield spreads. Using Merton’s approach,
this structure may vary in shape depending on the
value of the firm’s debt/asset ratio: while this ratio
remains below one, the term structure of spreads is
upward sloping (or hump-shaped), but inverts when
the ratio is equal to or over one. This can be
explained by the following: the value of the bond
depends on the default probability which in turn
depends on the value of the firm. For a given debt,
the higher the value of the firm, the lower the default
probability and, in principle, the higher the firm’s
rating. Yet, with a high rating, such as AAA or Aaa,
there is an asymmetry effect given that, as the
default probability is already low, the potential for
improvement is minimal, whereas the potential for
the firm’s situation to deteriorate is much greater,
and therefore the default probability increases along
with maturity. The term structure of spreads is
therefore (slightly) upward sloping. Conversely, with
a low rating at issue, such as Cc or C, the potential
for improvement is equal to or greater than that for
deterioration. The longer the bond, the higher the
value of the firm (assuming that it survives), which
could explain the inversion of the term structure of
spreads. Lastly, for firms with intermediate ratings,
the short-term potential for deterioration is
predominant but is offset by the long-term potential
for improvement, which is likely to result in a
hump-shaped spread curve.
The chart below confirms this theory for risky
AAA-rated bonds, but is less clear for BBB-rated
bonds (see Part 2).
Term structure of credit spreads, corporate bonds
(euro area)












Sources: Merrill Lynch, Bloomberg
NB :  There is no significant index for BBB rated bonds with a maturity of 10 years.
The various econometric studies carried out on the
term structure of spreads (Litterman and Iben 1991,
Fons 1994 and Duffee 1999) converge towards the
same result: for investment grade issues, the
structure is upward sloping and this slope becomes
steeper for lower-grade issuers. Conversely, for
speculative grade issues, the results of the main
studies diverge. Indeed, while authors such as Sarig
and Varga (1989) and Fons (1994) find that, for these
issues, the term structure of spreads is inverted,
which corroborates Merton’s findings, other authors,
such as Helwege and Turner (1999), contest this
inversion. The main argument put forward is that
in the tests carried out there is a selection bias in
the choice of maturities: among the firms with the
same rating, the least risky tend to issue the longest
bonds. Consequently, the average spread narrows
as the maturity lengthens, while for a given firm
the spread widens along with the maturity. Helwege
and Turner avoid this problem by using a basket of
bonds with different maturities for a given firm. The
term structure of yield spreads is therefore likely to
be upward sloping regardless of the issuer’s rating.FSR • How much credit should be given to credit spreads? • November 2002 93
A construction recipe for term structures of credit spreads
Litterman and Iben (1991) suggest constructing a term structure of credit spreads on the assumption that
bonds have a higher default probability for the more distant maturities. Without supporting this assertion
with economic theory, they posit a simplified iterative method for assessing these probabilities using yield
curves for government and corporate zero-coupon bonds, assuming that the recovery rate is zero in the event
of default.
For an investor, the expected yield of a risk-free bond (government bond) and a risky bond (corporate) is the same.
Let :
0RiG denote the zero-coupon rate (spot) with maturity i of a government bond
0RiC denote the zero-coupon rate (spot) with maturity i of a corporate bond
pd denote the default probability
Vic and ViG the prices of zero-coupon bonds with maturity i.
For the first year, we obtain:
(1 + 0R1G) = (1 + 0R1C) x (1 – pd)
or V1G = V1C / (1 – pd)
hence pd = 1 – (V1C / V1G)
For the second year, two-year bonds are used; the default probability obtained is a forward probability
pd f (between the end of period 1 and the end of period 2) and can only exist if a default has not occurred in
the first year.
Given that:
[(1 + 0R2) 2 / (1 + 0R1)] = (1 + 1F2)
with 1F2  being the one-year forward rate
or : VF = V2 / V1
hence : pdf = 1 – (VFC / VFG )   etc.
With a default probability increasing along with the horizon, they find the term structure of spreads to be
upward sloping, as do most of the authors who have analysed this structure.94 FSR • How much credit should be given to credit spreads? • November 2002
On the basis of these main theoretical approaches,
practitioners have developed more operational
models for managing default risk such as KMV-type
models, derived from the structural approach, and
“maximum loss” models such as Value at Risk, e.g.
J.P. Morgan’s “Creditmetrics”. All of these models
however encounter a number of difficulties, not least
of which is accurately measuring spreads using
market data. Above and beyond these difficulties,
the most important issue is to assess the true
information content of credit spreads and to assess
the contribution of the default risk variable in the
various explanatory variables of yield spreads.
2|1 The problems involved
in measuring spreads
While it appears simple to calculate the yield spread
between corporate and government bonds, this
spread depends firstly on the type of rate used (the
yield to maturity or the spot rate) and secondly on
the availability of the representative rate, which in
turn depends on the liquidity of the bonds used.
Moreover, historical variations in the yield spread
are affected by the instability of credit agencies’
ratings.
Biases resulting from the use of different rates
The most simple method for obtaining a credit
spread is to calculate the difference between the
yield to maturity of a corporate bond and that of a
government bond of the same maturity. However,
the spread obtained in this way is only an
approximate measurement of the true credit spread
since it will also depend, as with all yields to
maturity, on the coupon size of the chosen bonds.
In other words, by directly comparing two bonds
with the same maturity, we are in fact comparing
two bonds that have neither the same duration (price
sensitivity to interest rate changes), nor the same
convexity (sensitivity to the slope of the yield curve).
Calculating spreads on an aggregated basis using
bond indices is subject to the same difficulties.
2| Credit risk:
the limitations of empirical analysis
Empirical studies aiming to obtain a more rigorous
measurement of spreads use two kinds of method:
– They either calculate the modified duration 5 of
bonds and, where necessary, the option adjusted
duration for bonds with an embedded option; the
spread then corresponds to the difference in the
yield to maturity between bonds with the same
duration, which makes it possible to partially
offset the coupon effect on the yield to maturity.
This solution is closer to that used by market
participants: the decline in Treasury bond
outstandings as of 1997 steadily prompted players
to quote spreads against the swap yield curve
instead of yield to maturity spreads. As swap rates
correspond to the yield to maturity at par 6, this
approach makes it possible to measure spreads
correctly for corporate bonds issued at par, or
close to par. We should however stress two
limitations: first, if the price of corporate bonds
is far from par, the spread becomes approximate.
Second, bonds with the same duration may have
different convexities and therefore different
interest rate curve risks.
– Or they use a zero-coupon rate curve (spot rate)
for both government and corporate bonds. The
major drawback is that this requires that rates be
estimated using techniques that are relatively
reliable but onerous to implement. The
advantage of using this approach is that yield
spreads can be measured more accurately.
In order to calculate these rates, the bond prices used
are those of the latest transactions or the most recent
bid prices. Irrespective of the type of rate used, and
despite the considerable growth of the corporate bond
market — with the nominal outstanding for the euro
area totalling EUR 2,690 billion at the end of 2001, i.e.
half that of the US market — the  lack of liquidity on
certain bonds introduces another bias into the data
used: either there are not enough quotations, or the
prices quoted are not significant (no transactions for a
long time). These prices should thus be estimated by
interpolation, or using a price matrix, taking high-grade
bonds with similar ratings, sectors and durations.
5 The modified duration is equal to the duration divided by the interest rate factor (1+R).
6 The swap rate corresponds to the coupon in such a way that the price is equal to par, i.e. the coupon equals the yield to maturity.FSR • How much credit should be given to credit spreads? • November 2002 95
Ideally, a term structure of rates corresponding to
the term structure of the default probability should
be obtained. This structure varies from one issuer
to the next, and only governments, and a few very
large issuers such as mortgage agencies, have
sufficient borrowing capacity to issue on all
maturities. The best solution is therefore to group
issuers from the same sector and with the same
rating and only use plain vanilla bonds, or callable
or puttable bonds provided that option adjusted
spread is calculated. However, even borrowers
issuing in the same currency with identical ratings
and maturities may incur different borrowing costs.
For example, the graph below shows that even AAA
sovereign issuers are subject to rate differentials.
The paper by Elton and al. (2001) on the US market
for AAA to BB-rated bonds over the period
1987-1996 allows us to corroborate some conclusions
drawn from theoretical analyses: the corporate
spread is wider for lower-grade issues regardless of
their maturity; the financial sector spread is wider
than the industrial sector spread for all maturities
and ratings. Above all, we observe an upward sloping
spread curve for investment grade bonds, consistent
with the models of Merton (1974) and Jarrow and
al. (1997), and a hump-shaped structure for
BBB-rated industrial bonds, also consistent with the
results obtained using these models and those and
Sarig and Varga (1989) and Fons (1994) 7.
The instability of ratings
Using reduced-form models, the value of risky bonds
is obtained using the price of a risk-free bond of the
same duration, the risk-neutral default probability
and the recovery rate in the event of default on the
risky bond (see section 1|2). The difficulty in valuing
risky bonds arises from the fact that this default
probability does not correspond to the historical
default probability of a rating category because the
latter may, for a given bond, by revised during the
bond’s life. It is therefore necessary to use the
transition probabilities of ratings based on historical
data, which are also provided by credit rating
agencies.
However, these matrices are themselves unstable
over time. For example, this can be observed by
simply comparing the average percentage over a
one-year horizon for two different periods: according
to Moody’s (2002), 89,09% of issues remained Aaa
for the period 1970-2001 compared with 85% for the
7 Provided that the BBB rating is considered to be a low-grade issue (see Section 1.3, the refutation of this result by Helwege and Turner 1999 explains
that this result is due to the selection bias relating to the issuance maturity).
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period 1983-2001, and 62.90% and 54.21%
respectively for the Caa-C, which seems to indicate
a lower stability of ratings. In this respect, it is
interesting to note the growing asymmetry between
the number of ratings downgrades and upgrades: in
1970, Moody’s downgraded 21 US bonds and
upgraded 23, while in 1990, it downgraded 301 and
upgraded only 61 8. This growing asymmetry has
been observed for both investment grade and
speculative grade bonds.
There are two possible interpretations for this: either
the creditworthiness of US firms has recently declined,
or ratings criteria have become stricter, i.e. a lower
rating for the same ratios. In order to interpret this
data accurately, it is necessary to carry out an in-depth
analysis of both changes in companies’ financial and
accounting ratios over time and changes in the
behaviour of credit rating agencies in terms of how
they use publicly available information to set their
ratings. Blume, Lim and Mackinlay (1998) carried out
a study of this nature for the period 1978-1995 and
concluded that ratings criteria have become stricter,
assuming however that agencies do not have access
to private information and that the interpretation of
these ratios has not changed over time.
Overall, the instability of ratings — reflected by
transition matrices — together with the instability of
these matrices and the stricter rating criteria, makes
it more difficult to estimate default probabilities. The
technical difficulties involved in measuring credit
spreads and the fact that most market participants
accept an approximate measurement make
interpreting these spreads even more delicate.
2|2 The information content
of credit spreads
Assuming that we have resolved the problem of
measuring credit spreads, we still have to check that
these spreads actually offset the potential loss on
risky bonds so that, for a risk-neutral investor, the
return on risk-free bonds is the same as that on risky
bonds. In other words, do yield spreads reflect
default risk — default probability with a given
recovery rate — or do they contain other explanatory
factors?
Whether we use structural models or reduced-form
models, it appears that spreads estimated on the
basis of default risk do not correspond to the yield
spreads measured, i.e. to credit spreads:
– Merton-type structural models generate spreads
that are much narrower than those observed
empirically, and very short-term spreads that are
almost zero, which is also not the case in reality.
– Despite the fact that reduced-form models use
marginal default rates estimated by means of
transition matrices and recovery rates, they do
not explain the differences in spreads between
bonds with different ratings given that
lower-grade bonds are less liquid (see below).
Yet, the liquidity premium is an essential factor
in yield spreads.
Above and beyond the usual criticisms that can be
made of the models themselves and their implicit
assumptions — perfect capital markets, continuous
1 0 0 2 - 0 7 9 1 d o i r e p r o f x i r t a m n o i t i s n a r T
s r a e y n e t f o n o z i r o h e g a r e v a n a r e v O
) % a s a (
w e N : g n i t a r a a Aa AA a a Ba BB C - a a Ct l u a f e Dl a w a r d h t i W
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A 9 3 . 09 4 . 0 17 8 . 8 34 2 . 5 12 3 . 49 5 . 10 2 . 07 3 . 12 5 . 7 2
a a B7 1 . 02 6 . 23 4 . 7 13 2 . 6 20 1 . 81 9 . 23 2 . 07 7 . 33 5 . 8 3
a B3 2 . 06 7 . 02 6 . 54 5 . 1 12 3 . 1 10 9 . 64 5 . 04 3 . 4 14 7 . 8 4
B5 0 . 01 0 . 09 7 . 13 2 . 42 2 . 95 6 . 98 4 . 03 8 . 7 24 7 . 6 4
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8 The increase in the absolute number of rating revisions is due to the substantial rise in the number of corporate issues, and thus we should focus on
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trading, no sudden price changes, etc. — these results
should be interpreted bearing in mind that default
risk is only one part of the credit spread. We should
therefore consider the other components of this
spread and ask ourselves whether risk-neutral
investors really exist and whether a systematic risk
premium is included.
The spread between the credit
and the default spread
The empirical study by Delianedis and Geske (2001),
which is based on the structural model, reveals that
default risk only accounts for a small proportion of
the credit spread, confirming the results obtained
by Elton, Gruber and al. (2001) using the
reduced-form model. Drawing on monthly data from
November 1991 to December 1998 on US corporate
bond prices, Delianedis and Geske measured the
residual spread between the credit spread observed
and the default spread calculated. Their model
included the possibility of partial recovery and tax
effects that are specific to the United States.
These figures show that the residual spread accounts
for between 95.4% for the AAA and 77.7% for the B
of the credit spreads. Consequently, for investment
grade firms, the main part of spreads is not
accounted for by default risk, and the higher the
grade the smaller the proportion of default risk.
Admittedly, the value of default spreads depends
on the recovery rate used (65% in the table above),
but the sensitivity is relatively low: by moving this
rate from 100% to 0%, the default spreads widen from
1 (17) to 8 (72) basis points for the AAA (and BBB
respectively). This sensitivity is likely to be much
greater for speculative grade bonds that have a higher
default probability.
The values obtained for the default spreads calculated
— and hence implicitly the residual spreads — are
also sensitive to those used for constructing structural
models. For example, the volatility of the stock (a
proxy to the firm’s assets) would have to rise by over
100% in relation to the observed volatility in order to
explain the residual spreads in the jump-diffusion
model. In other words, other explanatory factors must
be sought. In this respect the following variables
should be considered: the interest rate, the term
premium, the return on equity, the stock market risk,
the systematic risk premium and, above all, bonds’
liquidity.
The essential role of liquidity
The results of econometric studies testing the
influence of these different factors (Ericsson and
Renault 2001, Delianedis and Geske 2001, Houweling
and al. 2002) concur on at least one point: the liquidity
factor plays a fundamental role in explaining the level
of credit spreads, via the residual spread.
While there is no doubt as to the role played by
liquidity, its impact on yield spreads depends on the
indicator used to measure liquidity. Houweling and
al. set out to measure the liquidity premium between
two corporate bond portfolios in euro, one comprising
the most liquid bonds and the other the least liquid,
using four different liquidity criteria: issue size, the
age, number of quotations and dispersion of quotations.
For the period January 1999 to May 2001, they obtained
a premium of 0.2 basis points when the liquidity was
measured simply by issue size, but a premium of
14 basis points when it was measured by the number
of years since the issue date, 27 basis points measured
by the number of quotations and 47 basis points
measured by the dispersion of quotations!
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Delianedis and Geske, in an attempt to explain the
residual spread, propose a more original
measurement of liquidity: they use the monthly
volume of transactions of equities corresponding to
the bonds, which they justify by the fact that, in
order to hedge a corporate bond, government bonds
are necessary to hedge the interest rate risk but
equities are also necessary to hedge the default risk.
The negative relationship between the variation of
the residual spread and the variation of liquidity
logically increases as the rating decreases (it is not
really necessary to hedge a AAA-rated bond with
equities). Furthermore, it is only statistically
significative for lower-grade bonds, and the authors
therefore conclude that an increase in liquidity
results in a narrowing of the residual spread, and,
more specifically, in a narrowing of the credit
spread, without affecting the default spread.
Ericsson and Renault test the following two
assumptions for the period 1986-1996: liquidity
premiums are higher for risky bonds and the term
structure of liquidity premiums is downward-sloping.
Their results confirm that liquidity does indeed have
its expected impact. On average, a recently issued
bond (i.e. less than three months) has a spread of
14 basis points below that of older bonds. This spread
widens as the rating decreases: it is 11 basis points
for high-grade bonds, but 33 basis points for bonds
with a low rating. As regards the term structure of
liquidity premiums, the authors obtain a fundamental
result: it is downward-sloping, which explains the flat
credit spreads for high-grade bonds found by Duffee
(1999), whereas the models give an upward-sloping
term structure of credit spreads for low risk bonds.
The term structure of default spreads is upward-
sloping but these spreads only account for a small
proportion of credit spreads, and when we add the
decreasing liquidity premiums, a flat term structure
of credit spreads can be obtained.
Other explanatory factors
The systematic risk premium
Why should credit spreads include a risk premium of
this kind 9? As returns on corporate bonds are more
risky than those on government bonds, investors
naturally require a risk premium since a large part of
the risk is systematic, and therefore by definition
cannot be diversified: corporate bond yields vary
systematically with those of other risky assets such
as equities, while factors affecting equities do not affect
the yield on government bonds. Theoretically, the
expected loss on a corporate bond is negatively related
to equity prices because when the latter rise default
risk declines. Therefore there is, a priori, a systematic
component in corporate spreads. Indeed, E. Pedrosa
and Roll (1998), on the basis of sixty bond indices
(5 maturities, 4 sectors and 3 ratings) over the period
October 1995 to March 1997 using daily data, find that
time series of credit spreads are co-integrated  10,
suggesting that their non-stationary nature can be
attributed to common underlying factors. Elton et al.
(2001), who focus on the important role of systematic
risk, and do not take into account the liquidity factor,
put forward an additional explanation for the existence
of this risk: the risk premium required by investors
varies over time according to their degree of risk
aversion and affects both risky bonds and equities
alike, thus increasing the systematic component
of risk.
The influence of stock prices and their volatility
The stock market plays an important role in two
ways: first, a rise in prices, i.e. a positive return on
equity, is associated with a decline in the default
probability due to the decrease in leverage effect
and hence with a narrowing of default spreads;
second, an increase in stock market volatility, used
as a proxy to volatility of the firm’s assets in the
structural model, is associated with a rise in the
default probability and hence with a greater default
risk.
9 This question is no longer asked for equities as it is well-known that they entail a specific risk and a market risk known as the systematic risk.
10 Broadly speaking, co-integration implies that there is a long-term stable relationship between non-stationary series, i.e. series that do not return to
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Whether theoretical or empirical, most studies raise the implicit, but nevertheless fundamental,
question as to the relationship between credit spreads and stock prices. Such a link would justify the
existence of a degree of interdependence between equity markets and bond markets, which could
contribute to increasing financial instability. However, this relationship is subject to some uncertainty.
In this respect, we should emphasise two important points: first, it is difficult to measure credit
spreads accurately and, second, it appears that the liquidity premium (and not the default premium)
constitutes the main explanatory variable of these spreads.
It is therefore important to be cautious when interpreting the value of or variations in these spreads,
as the credit given to credit spreads is not without default risk!100 FSR • How much credit should be given to credit spreads? • November 2002
We know that the price of an asset is simply equal
to the sum of the discounted value of future cash
flows. The difficulty lies in the fact that these flows
are only known with certainty for a “risk-free” asset:
irrespective of the state, these flows will be the same.
However, these flows will differ for a risky asset,
and will have to be estimated using default
probabilities, transition matrices and the recovery
rate.
Let us take, for example, two bonds with a maturity
of one year with two possible states at this maturity:
one risk-free, with a redemption value (face value)
of one euro, irrespective of the state; the other, risky,
with a redemption value of two euro in state A and
three euro in state B. The price of the risk-free bond
is 0.95 euro and that of the risky bond is 2.4 euro.
Furthermore, let us assume that the present value
of a euro in state A equals VA and that of a euro in
state B equals VB. Intuitively, we understand that
VA+VB is equal to the present value of one euro in
one year irrespective of the state, in other words,
equal to the price of a one-year risk-free bond with
a face value of one euro.
As there are no arbitrage opportunities, there is a
relationship between VA, VB, the future cash flows
of the two bonds and the present value — the price
— of these assets:
1VA+1VB = 0,95  and  2VA+3VB = 2,4
Hence: VA = 0,45 and VB = 0,5
Appendix:
Some intuitive elements regarding the valuation of risky assets
using risk-neutral probabilities
It is also possible to re-write these equations to obtain
the risk-neutral valuation, i.e. so that the expected
yield on each bond is equal to the risk-free interest
rate:
(VA+VB) x [VA/(VA+VB) + VB/(VA+VB)] = 0,95  and
(VA+VB) x [2VA/( VA+VB) + 3VB/( VA+VB)] = 2,4
let qi = Vi/( VA+VB) with i = A or B
qi may be interpreted as a probability since it is
positive and since qA+qB = 1
Yet, the yield R on the risk-free bond is such that:
1+R = 1/ (VA+VB) = future value/present value
(i.e. R = 5.3%)
We can therefore write:
[1/(1+R)] x (qA+qB) = 0,95  and
[1/(1+R)] x (2qA+3qB) = 2,4
Thus, if investors are risk-neutral, the yield on each
bond is equal to the risk-free interest rate and the
price of a risky bond is equal to:
Vt = [1/(1+R)] x  Eq(Vt+1)
This is why qA and qB are named risk-neutral
probabilities (which are not the probabilities of
occurrence of the two states). And for this reason, in
order to value risky assets, it is necessary to adjust
the historical probabilities of default and the recovery
rates with transition matrices in order to obtain the
risk-neutral probabilities.FSR • How much credit should be given to credit spreads? • November 2002 101
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